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The CrimsonLogic Case: When is a Judgment not a 
Judgment? 
On 29 December 2006, the District Court delivered a 67-page oral judgment acquitting all four defendants 
in the CrimsonLogic case. Despite the length of his judgment, the trial judge stated that he would 
'elaborate on these reasons if it becomes necessary'. In the light of the CrimsonLogic case, this article 
examines the propriety and legality of the recent practice amongst some Subordinate Courts' judges of 
writing first or oral judgments prior to their written Grounds of Decision. 
 
After a 62-day trial, which concluded on 29 December 2006, all four defendants in the CrimsonLogic 
case1 were acquitted. The accused were the CEO, Financial Controller, Vice-President of the Trade & 
Logistics Business Unit and Corporate Counsel of CrimsonLogic, an IT systems provider. They were 
charged, on one count, with engaging in a conspiracy to pay a bribe of $35,000 to Mathias Tan, an IT 
manager of the supermarket Carrefour, as an inducement for Tan to recommend the award of an IT 
contract to CrimsonLogic.  
In acquitting the defendants, the trial judge declared that there was a 'serious doubt' as to the guilt of the 
fourth accused (the corporate counsel) and 'reasonable doubt' as to the guilt of the other three 
defendants.2 This appeared to be an affirmation of the judge's view of the greater degree of innocence of 
the fourth accused as opposed to any application of double standards of proof for different accused 
persons in the same trial.  
Among the many interesting features3 of the CrimsonLogic case is what happened at the conclusion of 
the trial. The District Judge read out a 67-page 'oral judgment' to a packed courtroom for over two hours.4 
The following day, the parties received from the court, by e-mail, a 69-page, 234-paragraph written 
document titled 'Oral Judgment'. It was dated 29 December 2006.  
The oral judgment contained a number of qualifications or caveats. For example, it was stated that not all 
the evidence adduced in court had been set out but would 'focus on the evidence of the key prosecution 
witnesses'.5 Only 'the main reasons'6 for his decision would be given in the judgment. The reasons for this 
become clear with the learned District Judge's declaration that he 'will elaborate on these reasons if it 
becomes necessary'.7 
Thus in the oral judgment, the trial judge was only dealing with the 'main reasons' for his decision. No 
doubt, if the prosecution were minded to appeal, he would further 'elaborate on these reasons'.8 Again at 
page 69, paragraph 232, of the judgment comes the notice that despite his finding that the ethical lapse 
on the part of a company employee did not amount to a conspiracy to pay a bribe, the learned judge 'will 
elaborate on [his] analysis on the law of corruption if the need arises', again obviously if there were an 
appeal.  
  
The Questions 
Was this 'oral' judgment, then, declared 'oral' to enable a second judicial bite at the cherry in the event of 
an appeal? Was that the reason the reader (or should it be listener of the written 'oral judgment') was 
informed at the conclusion of the judgment that the judge's findings were on 'particular factual issues 
including situations where I found the prosecution had not discharged its burden of proof'?9 Or was the 
judge obliged to determine all the relevant factual issues, based on, to use the correct judicial parlance, 
the totality of the evidence adduced before him? Or was that too to be considered only 'if the need arises' 
in a subsequent judgment? 
All this raises a number of more fundamental questions. What is a judgment? What is its purpose? When 
does it achieve finality? Can it be delivered in parts as and when a judge decides? Can there be two or 
more judgments from the same court in one case? Do the same rules apply for trial judges in both the 
High Court and the Subordinate Courts? What is the effect of multiple judgments? When does an oral 
judgment cease to be a judgment? Or perhaps, more importantly, when is an oral judgment not a 
judgment for purposes of the Criminal  
Procedure Code?10 
These questions have become important in the wake of an increasing number of first or oral judgments 
that are presently being delivered by Subordinate Courts' judges. These are variously described as, for 
example, 'Oral' or 'Brief' or 'Remarks'.11 In the event a notice of appeal is filed, these are then 
supplemented or substituted by written Grounds of Decision, as required under s 247(3) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. These first judgments are not included in the records of the appeal although s 219 of 
the Code requires the 'original judgment' to be entered and, if written, to be filed with the record of 
proceedings. This is perhaps one of the reasons that the propriety of writing double judgments has 
escaped the scrutiny of the  
High Court.  
Double Judgments 
The writing of double judgments in the Subordinate Courts is a recent practice. It is not clear how or why 
it was started. It certainly was previously frowned upon, especially in the light of the 1964 decision in PP v 
John Thien.12 In that case, at the end of a corruption trial, the District Judge read out a two-page 
judgment referred to as a 'brief judgment'. After notice of appeal was filed, the judge wrote a seven-page 
'Grounds of Decision'. Wee Chong Jin CJ allowed an application to expunge the Grounds of Decision 
from the record. He accepted what was said by Rigby J in Loh Kwang Seang13 that it was not permissible 
for a trial court, having signed and delivered its Grounds of Decision, to alter it by supplementing it.14 
Consequently, only the earlier oral judgment was considered during the appeal. This decision was 
followed more recently in Van Damme Johannes v PP .15 
This recent practice in our lower courts, of writing more than one reasoned judgment, appears to be 
neither supported by legislation nor case law in Singapore and Malaysia. 
The Applicable Law: Legislation 
Every court exercising criminal jurisdiction is required under the Criminal Procedure Code to deliver its 
judgment at the conclusion of the trial and its 'Grounds of Decision' upon a notice of appeal being filed.16 
Although the word 'judgment' is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, a judgment is the final order 
made by a criminal court resulting in the conviction or acquittal of the accused.17 This was reiterated by 
Yong Pung How CJ in Lim Teck Leng Roland v PP:18 
The word 'judgment' is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. The Halsbury's Laws of England, 
Hailsham Ed, Vol IX, paras 260-265 explains it as a final order in a trial terminating in the conviction or 
acquittal of the accused. In Chhotey Lal v Tinkey Lal (1935) AIR 815, the court regarded that an order in 
the nature of a judgment is one which is passed on full enquiry and after hearing both parties. 
A judgment is, therefore, no more than a statement that a judge makes at the end of a trial to inform the 
accused of his decision in the case. Section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires the 'original 
judgment' to be entered and, if written, filed with the record of the proceedings.  
Chapter XXIV of the Criminal Procedure Code prescribes the manner in which a judgment in every 
criminal court is to be delivered. It is required to be pronounced in open court and in the presence of the 
accused.19 Further, the judgment shall in all cases be explained to the accused.20 It is, therefore, the 
accused that the judge addresses in pronouncing his judgment,21 unlike the Grounds of Decision which is 
largely written so that the appellate court is informed of the reasons for the judgment and sentence, if 
any.22 A subordinate court is under a statutory obligation to forward to the High Court the Grounds of 
Decision upon a notice of appeal being filed.23  
A judgment under the Criminal Procedure Code is distinct in both form and substance from the Grounds 
of Decision. It is the Grounds of Decision which set out the reasoning leading to the judgment.24 As 
explained by Ismail Khan J in Balasingham v PP,25 the Grounds of Decision constitute 'a reasoned 
judgment on the facts and the law, not merely the conclusion arrived at' which is what a judgment under 
the Criminal Procedure Code is.  
The other provision that a lower court judge risks offending, if he were to write two or more judgments, is 
s 217 of the Criminal Procedure Code which incorporates the functus officio rule. Section 217 of the Code 
prohibits a subordinate court from altering or reviewing its judgment except to rectify a clerical error or 
other mistake26 before it rises for the day. As explained by the Singapore High Court in Chiaw Wai Onn v 
PP 27 and in a number of subsequent decisions: 
s 217(1) would lay down a general prohibition against alteration of judgments by the subordinate courts. 
And s 217(2) was an excepting proviso to this prohibition by prescribing the limited circumstances in 
which the subordinate courts could alter or review their judgments. 
Judicial Decisions 
The Malaysian judiciary's approach 
There are a number of Malaysian decisions which have consistently held that it is not permissible for a 
trial judge whether in the High Court or the lower court to deliver a judgment and subsequently 
supplement or add to the judgment, in a written Grounds of Decision.28 The decision of Spenser-
Wilkinson J in PP v Heng You Nang29 is particularly significant. He held that when a written judgment is 
delivered, it is perfected as soon as it is delivered and signed and if an oral judgment is delivered, it is 
perfected as soon as it has been pronounced and signed.  
In Ankur Nath Ganguli v PP,30 the trial judge gave reasons for convicting the appellant, and this judgment 
was reduced in writing. He later wrote his 'Grounds of Decision'. It was contended that the subsequent 
addition to the oral judgment should be disregarded by the court. The Malaysian Court of Appeal, in 
considering s 21 of the Courts Ordinance31 (which is identical to s 46 of the Singapore Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act, Cap. 322), held that 'if a trial Judge gives no reasons which are recorded for convicting an 
accused person, then and then only he can on notice of appeal being given write his Grounds of Decision 
which shall form part of the record'. It refused to consider the later judgment. 
Some 30 years later, the Malaysian Supreme Court was asked to re-examine the problem in Lorraine 
Phylis Cohen & Anor v PP.32 The accused in this case had been convicted of trafficking in dangerous 
drugs. At the conclusion of the trial the judge handed down a 15-page oral judgment which was dated and 
signed. Some 15 months later, he purported to hand down another written judgment or Grounds of 
Decision. The Court of Appeal allowed an application by the accused persons for an order that only the 
original judgment be included in the record of appeal. It held that it was not competent for the trial judge to 
supplement his first judgment by delivering a second judgment or Grounds of Decision.  
It is interesting to note that in this case the Public Prosecutor sought to distinguish Ankur Nath Ganguli33 
on the ground that in Lorraine's case the oral judgment was incomplete as it had dealt only with the 
prosecution case and not with the defence case. In rejecting that submission, the Supreme Court 
observed:34 
Once the learned judge delivered his judgment in writing, dated and signed it, such judgment could not be 
altered or supplemented by another judgment. Section 278 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not 
assist us. Section 278 (identical to s 217 of the Singapore Criminal procedure Code) provides:  
No court, other than a High Court, having once recorded its judgment, shall alter or review the same; 
provided that a clerical error may be rectified at any time, and that any other mistake may be rectified at 
any time before the court rises for the day … 
Earlier this year, this principle was further tested before the Malaysian Court of Appeal by the Public 
Prosecutor in a rather innovative manner. In Public Prosecutor v Hanif Basree bin Abdul Rahman,35 the 
accused had been acquitted by the High Court on a charge of murder, without his defence being called. 
In the course of the appeal, the Public Prosecutor applied to the Court of Appeal to exercise its powers 
under s 60(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 196436 to direct the trial judge to write a supplementary 
judgment to include certain parts of his oral judgment delivered in open court. These had been omitted in 
his written grounds six weeks later. The Public Prosecutor argued that what was omitted in the Grounds 
of Decision were erroneous findings which had influenced the trial judge's decision and that their omission 
in the later Grounds of Decision had deprived him of challenging these. The findings said to have been 
omitted were in respect of the DNA profile of the accused and certain DNA evidence. The Court of Appeal 
refused to exercise its discretion under the Court of Judicature Act to do so. It held that in the 
circumstances of the case it would be 'wrong in principle' to require a supplementary judgment as there 
was a written, signed judgment before the court.37  
 
Singapore decisions before 1994 
As pointed out earlier, the problem of double judgments was considered and resolved by the Singapore 
High Court in 1964 in PP v John Thien.38 In that case, Wee Chong Jin CJ allowed an application to 
expunge from the record the Grounds of Decision of a District Judge and considered only his earlier oral 
'brief judgment' that had been read out in court. 
Following this decision, even High Court judges were careful to avoid writing double judgments and 
hence burdening the appellate court with having to deal with legal challenges to their judgments as a 
result. In Van Damme Johannes v PP,39 for example, Rajendran J declined to write any additional 
Grounds of Decision. This was despite having delivered an oral judgment at the conclusion of the trial in 
which he had indicated he would be reviewing the evidence in full, in a written Grounds of Decision. He 
subsequently felt that s 46(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act40 and the decision in Ankur Nath41 
did not support such a practice of writing Grounds of Decision following the delivery of a judgment.  
 
1994: The beginning of the exception  
The problem arose again, 40 years after John Thien, in Goh Lai Wak v PP.42 In that case the question for 
the Court of Appeal was whether, having delivered an oral judgment at the conclusion of the trial, the trial 
judge was precluded from writing his Grounds of Decision. The Court of Appeal began by first approving 
the leading Malaysian authorities on the subject:43 
We agree with the propositions enunciated in Ankur Nath and Lorraine Phylis Cohen. A judge cannot 
subsequently give his grounds of decision if he has already delivered a prior judgment at the conclusion 
of the trial which contains his reasons for convicting the accused. 
Despite upholding the clear principles enunciated in these Malaysian decisions, the Court of Appeal, 
nevertheless, sought to explain away the earlier of the two judgments. It did this, erroneously it is 
submitted with respect, on the basis of s 218 of the Criminal Procedure Code:44 
This principle does not affect the operation of s 218 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68) which 
provides that a judgment shall be explained to the accused. There cannot be any objection to a judge 
providing briefly at the conclusion of a trial an outline of the issues before him and the evidence on them, 
and to indicate briefly, without reasons, his findings on them. In such circumstances, there should be no 
objection if subsequent written grounds of decision are delivered in which the evidence is fully reviewed 
and the judge's detailed reasons or grounds for his findings are comprehensively recorded. (emphasis 
added) 
On that basis and given the brevity of the earlier oral judgment of some 300 words, the Court of Appeal 
found the submission that the trial judge ought not to have written the second judgment and which they 
ought to disregard, without merit 'on the facts of this case':45 
The trial judge had merely provided an oral summary of the evidence adduced at the trial, and had only 
indicated in a general sense that he disbelieved the appellant's defence and that he found the prosecution 
to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. In the context of this case, what the trial judge said in 
his oral statement did not amount to giving his reasons or grounds for convicting the appellant. We, 
therefore, disagreed with the contention that the trial judge was precluded from writing his grounds of 
decision and that we should disregard the grounds of decision. (emphasis added) 
The purpose of the trial judge outlining only the issues he had to decide and the evidence adduced in 
respect of these without indicating any of his views, findings or conclusions, is not clear. What indeed was 
the need for the trial judge to provide 'an oral summary of the evidence'? There was certainly no 
obligation on his part to do so and risk violating the principle against supplementing a judgment. 
It will be remembered that the word 'judgment' in Chapter XXIV of the Criminal Procedure Code (in which 
s 218 is placed) refers to only the final order resulting in the conviction or acquittal of the accused.46 
Therefore, s 218 of the Code merely provides that it is this final order that 'shall be explained to the 
accused' and, if he so desires, a 'translation in his own language shall be given to him'. It is submitted, 
with respect, that s 218 only requires the judge to explain his decision of an acquittal or conviction. This is 
a mandatory provision to ensure an understanding of the trial court's decision by the accused person.47 It 
does not thereby require the judge to state his reasons for his decision. The Code contains no provisions 
for 'brief judgments' containing an outline of the issues and the evidence which the Court of Appeal 
sanctioned in Goh Lai Wak.48 That exercise was the trial judge's statutory duty, under s 247(3) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, in his written Grounds of Decision when the notice of appeal was filed. As a 
result, what the judge did subsequently was to supplement his earlier oral judgment. This clearly resulted 
in an alteration or review of the earlier judgment which is expressly prohibited by s 217 of the Code.49  
Indeed, if the Court of Appeal in Goh Lai Wak was concerned about upholding the conviction, it could 
have still done so by disregarding the written Grounds of Decision. As the court acknowledged, even if 
the Grounds of Decision had been excluded, 'there was overwhelming evidence which amply justified the 
trial judge's findings (which he made in his oral judgment)' that the prosecution had proved its case 
beyond reasonable doubt. Such a course would have upheld, what Lee Hun Hoe CJ described in 
Lorraine, as the 'fundamental principle' that it is not competent for a trial judge to supplement a first 
judgment by delivering a second judgment or Grounds of Decision. It would have at least helped to curb 
further attempts to dilute it in the Singapore Courts and discourage trial judges from delivering multiple 
judgments.  
Very shortly after its decision in Goh Lai Wak, and perhaps because of it, the Court of Appeal faced a 
similar problem in Anyanwu v PP.50 The appellant was convicted for importing into Singapore a large 
quantity of diamorphine. On appeal, he argued, inter alia, that as the trial judge had already delivered an 
oral judgment, he had erred in writing his Grounds of Decision later. The Court of Appeal was, therefore, 
urged to consider only the earlier oral judgment.  
The Court of Appeal, whilst again acknowledging the correctness of the Malaysian decisions in Ankurr51 
and Lorraine,52 echoed what it had said in Goh Lai Wak,53 that there could not be 'any objection to a judge 
providing briefly at the conclusion of the trial an outline of the issues before him and to indicate briefly, 
without reasons, his findings'. It held that that was what the trial judge had done in Anyanwu too.54 That 
was surprising as in his oral judgment, the trial judge had stated the charge, the prosecution's case, the 
defence and his findings 'that the prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt, and that he 
had no doubt that the appellant knew that diamorphine was concealed in the rice cookers, and that 
accordingly, the appellant was guilt of the charge.' The oral judgment in this case was certainly of greater 
length and substance than the 300-word oral judgment complained of in Goh Lai Wak. 
How 'brief' must the outlines of the issues, evidence and findings in the first judgment of a trial judge be, 
to fall within the Goh Lai Wak test of approval, and without possibly violating the prohibition against 
altering and reviewing judgments under s 217 of our Criminal Procedure Code? When then does a 
judgment end and the Grounds of Decision begin? Is it determined by the title given to it and the 
qualifications it contains, as in the CrimsonLogic oral judgment? And what really are the limits of the rule 
of exception first enunciated in Goh Lai Wak?55 
It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal did not take the opportunity in Anyanwu to provide some 
guidelines for the lower courts. An example of how the High Court may have to second guess the Court of 
Appeal was demonstrated even seven years after the court's decision in Anyanwu.56 In PP v Muhammed 
Ali Hashim & Others,57 Rubin J, in acquitting one of the accused, explained his reasons for doing so in 
what he considered to be 'within the parameters laid out in Goh Lai Wak v PP' without explaining what 
these were. It was, however, an oral judgment that explained the two grounds on which he had rejected 
the prosecution evidence and why he had been persuaded by the testimony of the accused.  
Whatever the parameters in Goh Lai Wak may be, the 69-page oral judgment in CrimsonLogic certainly 
does not fall within. In his oral judgment, the District Judge set out the charge and examined the evidence 
of the three principal prosecution witnesses: Pang Kang Ming (in 13 pages, 46 paragraphs), Anthony 
Wong (six pages, 16 paragraphs) and Matthias Tan (five pages, 23 paragraphs). He then proceeded to 
deal at length with what he described as 'My Decision', which included an 'assessment of the evidence of 
Pang Kang Ming', 'findings' in respect of a crucial 14 April meeting involving the defendants, 'individual 
assessments of the case against each defendant' various parts of the evidence adduced by the 
defendants and submissions made on their behalf. These are contained in 45 pages, and 146 
paragraphs. He then devoted the rest of the 69-page judgment to his conclusions as to why the 
prosecution had failed to discharge its burden of proof. It is difficult to imagine how different the District 
Judge's Grounds of Decision would have been if the Public Prosecutor had appealed. 
Reasons Special to Subordinate Courts' Judges? 
The CrimsonLogic judgment prompted the writer to consider whether there were other reasons for the 
current practice amongst several lower court judges to deliver detailed oral judgments at the end of the 
trial.  
There are two possible explanations. The first is that Subordinate Courts' judges may be under the 
impression that the decisions in Goh Lai Wak and Anyanwu, which were appeals from decisions of High 
Court judges and which interpreted s 46(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, may not apply to 
lower courts judgments.58 This view ignores the fact that both Goh and Anyanwu approved of the 
Malaysian decision in Ankur Nath Ganguli.59 Ankur was also decided on the basis of the equivalent of s 
217 of the Criminal Procedure Code which prohibits all courts from altering or reviewing their judgments. 
The lower courts are also bound by the decision of the High Court in John Thien v PP60 where the 
Grounds of Decision written after an earlier judgment were expunged from the record of the appeal on the 
same ground. More importantly, Chapter XXiV of the Code, which governs judgments in summary trials in 
the lower courts, does not provide for the writing of double judgments. Instead, s 247(3) of the Code 
requires a written Grounds of Decision to be made available to the appellant 'when a notice of appeal has 
been lodged'. This is, for purposes of the present discussion, a more exact or directive provision than s 46 
of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act61 which requires a High Court judge to write his grounds of 
decision when a notice of appeal has been lodged 'if he has not already written his judgment' earlier. 
Secondly, lengthy preliminary or oral judgments may have been developed as a measure to manage 
public interest in well-publicised trials. The problem that has emerged is in respect of cases which have 
generated considerable public attention in the media. Some trial judges, in trying to keep the public 
informed through the media, have delivered oral judgments at the conclusion of such trials. These have 
tended to be more detailed than necessary for the purpose. The judge may exacerbate the problem by 
lengthening his preliminary judgments by 'cutting and pasting' from written submissions which have 
become both massive and routine especially in the longer trials. The simple answer for a judge who 
wishes to go beyond merely pronouncing his verdict or judgment in such cases is one supported by both 
principle and the authorities. The judge has the choice in such circumstances of reserving judgment, 
preparing his Grounds of Decision and reading out his Grounds of Decision as a 'judgment'. Alternatively, 
he could announce his verdict or judgment and write his Grounds of Decision should there be an appeal. 
Consequences of Writing Double Judgments 
Whatever the term used to describe an earlier judgment, the writing of more than one judgment in a case 
is not a practice that ought to be encouraged. It raises some obvious problems including the following: 
1 a second or subsequent judgment raises the danger of ex post facto justification;62  
2 as the Malaysian Supreme Court has cautioned:63 
Supplementary grounds after a written judgment has been delivered may well affect judicial credibility 
because they could easily be mistaken for the wisdom of hindsight rather than representing the actual 
decision-making process. Consequently, it is undesirable to have two written judgments in the same 
case. 
3 the appellate court may only consider the original judgment as it stands and disregard the subsequent 
Grounds of Decision: Habee Bur Rahman v PP [1071] 2 MLJ 194; Nathan v PP [1972] 2 MLJ 101; Loh 
Kwang Seang v PP [1960] MLJ 271; PP v John Thien [1964] MLJ ci; Ankur Nath Ganguli v PP [1956] 
MLJ 206; 
4 the later judgment or Grounds of Decision may be expunged from the record of the appeal leaving only 
the first judgment with all its inadequacies: PP v John Thien [1964] MLJ ci; Lorraine Phylis Cohen v PP 
[1989] 2 MLJ 288; 
5 the presence of more than one judgment may not generally constitute a miscarriage of justice to vitiate 
the trial (Loh Kwang Seang v PP [1960] MLJ 271) but if the first judgment is inadequate or defective and 
is the only judgment before the court, the court may well find that the trial judge's decision cannot be 
supported. The remaining judgment, for example, may lack vital considerations such as the weight of the 
evidence or absence of consideration of accomplice evidence: Ankur Nath Ganguli v PP [1956] MLJ 206;  
6 legal challenges to the first judgment on the ground that it was incomplete as not having dealt fully with 
the case for the prosecution or the defence: Ankur Nath Ganguli v PP [1956] MLJ 206 or that the Grounds 
of Decision was incomplete as it had omitted some findings originally indicated in the earlier judgment: PP 
v Hanif Basree bin Abdul Rahman [2007] 2 MLJ 320; 
7 applications for an order under s 54(2) and 22(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, Cap.322 that 
the judge write a supplementary judgment to include the omissions in his Grounds of Decision contained 
in his earlier judgment: PP v Haniff Basree bin Abdul Rahman [2007] 2 MLJ 320; Pendakwa Raya v 
Rungit Singh a/l Jaswant Singh (unreported case discussed in Hanif Basree). 
On a common sense view, whether the earlier or later judgment is disregarded or not, there is always the 
danger of the presence of differences in respect of the trial judge's findings and in his analysis of 
evidence or contradictions between the two or more judgments. These can be the subject of challenges 
to the trial judge's findings and on the very nature of his mental process in arriving at his conclusions.64 In 
the writer's respectful submission, the wisdom of a judge ought to prevail in steering him away from such 
an obviously tortuous path.  
Conclusion 
It is perhaps the absence of any guidelines or directions from the appellate courts on what is permissible 
in a judgment under s 212 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and what the parameters of that judgment 
ought to be, that may have contributed to the present problem of double judgments in the Subordinate 
Courts. It is hoped that the High Court will remedy the situation at the earliest opportunity. The more 
detailed a judge's reasoning in a preliminary or 'oral' judgment and the greater its length, the greater its 
finality and similarity with a Grounds of Judgment under s 247(3) of the Code.65 So when is a trial judge's 
judgment not a judgment under the Criminal Procedure Code? Answer: when it displays all the attributes 
of a Grounds of Decision.  
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